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LOW STAKES AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Adam M. Samaha* 
Many of us engage in debates, sometimes intense debates, over the proper method of 
constitutional interpretation for judges.  This Essay offers six reasons to believe that these debates 
involve low stakes, in the sense that the choice among competing methods will not determine 
outcomes in a significant number of important cases.  These reasons involve mainstream 
constraints, overlapping results, indeterminate results, intolerable results, interpretation without 
decision, and inconsequential decisions.  After a suitably brief investigation of theoretical and 
experimental resources on low-stakes decision making, the Essay suggests how debates over 
constitutional interpretation by judges might proceed if more people become convinced that the 
stakes are indeed low.  Three venues of debate are considered—academia, the judicial 
appointments process, and judiciaries—along with stakes beyond case outcomes. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The revolution will not be litigated, just as it will not be televised, 
and everyone should know that by now.1  Decades of investigation in-
dicates that judges often work at the margins of social life.  When 
court decisions do implicate key policy choices, they are constrained 
by forces beyond the control of judges.  Internal and external con-
straints ensure that judicial behavior cannot be explained by any 
straightforward notion of what individual judges prefer as a matter of 
policy, whether or not they enjoy tenure and salary protection.  
Courts are part of a larger, if developing, settlement that allows judi-
cial power in only a fraction of all significant social decisions.  For ex-
ample, earlier this year, the Supreme Court did step in to liberate 
corporate and union treasuries from a part of campaign finance reg-
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 1 See GIL SCOTT-HERON, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised, on PIECES OF A MAN (Flying Dut-
chman Productions 1971).  Actually, the revolution might be televised if “television” sur-
vives beyond this generation.  I put that question aside. 
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ulation.2  But last year, the Court had nothing to say about the Chrys-
ler bailout and bankruptcy,3 years have passed without the Court or-
dering anyone released from Guantánamo Bay,4 and no one expects 
the Court to do much notable work regarding a climate change trea-
ty, military deployments in Afghanistan, tax policy, budget deficits, 
trade deficits, economic growth, the unemployment rate, and so 
forth. 
If confidence in these observations is greater today than in earlier 
generations, the basic point is nevertheless not new.  Shortly before 
the Supreme Court bowed to the essential components of the New 
Deal, Dean Alfange wrote that the Court “has, with but few excep-
tions, adjusted itself in the long run to the dominant currents of pub-
lic sentiment.”5  True, judges have some effect on some people’s lives.  
The long run can be uncomfortably long.  Judicial intervention can 
conceivably instigate more significant changes over time.  And there 
remains much to discover about the determinants of judicial beha-
vior.  Courts adjust themselves to only a subset of all social, economic, 
and political forces.  Case outcomes are far from perfectly predicta-
ble, and a fairly accurate model of judicial behavior might not last 
more than a generation.  Things change.  But the last seventy years of 
scholarship on judicial behavior have been, to a significant degree, an 
extended confirmation of insights like Alfange’s. 
These considered impressions ought to raise questions about a 
longstanding debate:  the proper method of constitutional interpre-
 
 2 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (addressing in-
dependent expenditures on mass communications).  Lobbying expenditures were never 
so restricted, the Court upheld the disclosure requirements at issue, and it is not yet clear 
how excited corporate managers will be to use treasury funds on advertising that takes 
sides in contested candidate elections.  Still, Citizens United is evidence that the Court 
sometimes issues significant decisions at odds with mainstream public opinion, perhaps 
even if public opposition is predictable before the fact.  A useful area of research involves 
how the Court chooses (narrow) fields in which to march against strong headwinds.  But 
my focus here is more about how often this might happen and associated issues. 
 3 See Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2275, 2276 (2009) (per 
curiam) (refusing to stay the bankruptcy court’s orders permitting asset sales).  The 
Court did tell other judges to be more quiet about the matter, see Indiana State Police 
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015, 1015 (2009) (vacating the Court of Ap-
peals’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s orders and instructing that the appeal be 
dismissed as moot), and that announcement might be telling. 
 4 Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (continuing to maintain federal 
habeas jurisdiction over detainees), with Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235, 1235 (2010) 
(per curiam) (remanding a case involving the authority of federal courts to order the re-
lease of detainees). 
 5 DEAN ALFANGE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL WILL 40 (1937).  Alfange’s epi-
logue comments on the then-recently-decided NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 
U.S. 1 (1937).  See ALFANGE, supra at 237–39. 
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tation for judges.6  If more people become convinced that the judicial 
choice of interpretive method for constitutional issues is actually a 
low-stakes decision—in the sense that the choice will not determine 
outcomes in a significant number of important cases—then what will 
debates over this choice look like?  What should they look like?  
Should they take place at all? 
The first part of this Essay collects reasons to believe that this in-
terpretive choice is indeed a matter of low stakes for society.  A few of 
these reasons draw from doubts about the efficacy of judiciaries, or of 
judicial review, or even of constitutional law writ large.  But the con-
clusion about the stakes for constitutional interpretive choice in judi-
cial decisions does not depend on these broader doubts.  The stakes 
are probably low regardless; larger-scale doubts impose yet another 
potential ceiling on those stakes.  The second part of the essay sug-
gests ways in which the contemporary debate over constitutional in-
terpretation by judges might and should be affected by the perceived 
stakes for case outcomes.  This includes a brief discussion of theory 
and experimental evidence regarding the effect of stake size on be-
havior before moving on to debates over interpretive method.  Of 
course, inquiries into constitutional interpretation occur in many ve-
nues with many different participants.  I will therefore comment on 
how the stakes vary across these contexts, and why the outcomes in 
litigated cases are not the only stakes involved. 
Before going forward, two points of clarification are in order.  
First, this Essay concerns a debate happening in a particular time and 
place.  I will speak to the contemporary debate regarding judges in 
the United States without pretending to offer advice for other sys-
tems.  Second, assessing the stakes of a decision depends on the ob-
server’s values.  Although I hope that my analysis is largely insensitive 
to value commitments, it cannot be fully independent of those com-
mitments.  For instance, interpretive choices might allow some 
people to act with integrity or to achieve progress toward some truth 
 
 6 Here I use the term “interpretation” broadly to include prominent competing methods 
for judges to gain meaning from legal texts and to make constitutional decisions.  See gen-
erally Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 268, 268–70 (Jules Coleman & 
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (outlining settled and controversial principles of constitutional 
and statutory interpretation).  These methods include conventional contemporary un-
derstanding, moral readings, and originalist interpretations of text, as well as common-
law constitutionalism, minimalism, Thayerian deference, and representation reinforce-
ment.  There are narrower definitions of “interpretation,” of course, and I often find 
them useful.  But they would lower the stakes of debates over “interpretive method” even 
further.  See infra text accompanying notes 27–33. 
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that is important to them, even if those choices are not important in 
another way.  My interest is in the social impact of court decisions, 
which is a concern shared by many.  But “the stakes” are partly a func-
tion of who makes the assessment, and I do not mean to offer a uni-
versal answer to the stakes question. 
II.  LOW STAKES FOR INTERPRETIVE CHOICE 
Not a few critics have suggested that courts are taking over our 
lives in the name of the Constitution.7  This kind of complaint is 
normal.  Any meaningful judicial role in supreme law will prompt in-
tense objection from at least some quarters.  Someone is bound to 
complain whenever a judge privileges certain supposedly fundamen-
tal rights, or certain minority interests, or certain forms of reasoning, 
or certain forms of democracy, or ancient values, or elite values, or 
politically countercyclical values, or the last generation’s values, or 
whatever.  Our courts can and have served many functions over the 
years as part of a shifting arrangement of societal forces, and each of 
those functions has a victim of sorts. 
The strong-form complaints are easily exaggerated, however.  An 
extravagant claim of judicial dictatorship might be nothing more 
than manufactured outrage linked to a few easily consumed judicial 
decisions with an otherwise selective and passing influence on the 
world.  Whether or not strategically expressed indignation is part of 
the picture, there are reasons to believe that judicial decisions rarely 
make serious differences in the course of social life; and that judges 
cannot resolve all of their constitutional cases, let alone rise above si-
deshow status, by choosing one of the competing methods for inter-
preting the Constitution.  The social significance of constitutional 
decisions in the courts might be modest in most instances, and the 
significance of interpretive method within those decisions is certainly 
more modest still.  These observations would remain true, moreover, 
even if one of us could snap our fingers and have every judge agree to 
make level-best efforts to abide by a single method of constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
 7 I hesitate to place these books together, but the general message of warning can be found 
in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES:  WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG 
FOR AMERICA 1–17 (2005), and MARK REED LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK:  HOW THE SUPREME 
COURT IS DESTROYING AMERICA 9–13 (2005).  Levin portrays the threat of judicial tyranny 
as having come to pass. 
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A.  Six Reasons 
1.  Mainstream Constraint 
One way or another, judicial decisions usually end up avoiding 
conflict with mainstream thinking that prevails outside the court-
house.  Observers from Robert Dahl and Robert McCloskey through 
Gerald Rosenberg and Barry Friedman have indicated that judges are 
more conformists than radicals.8  The leading illustration is the Su-
preme Court’s flagging resistance to New Deal innovation. 
High-profile judicial capitulation should not lead us to overstate 
the point, of course.  There have been streaks of politically counter-
cyclical judging under any fair definition, and sometimes there is no 
congealed mainstream opinion of any depth to contradict.  Perhaps 
the best example of judicial independence from popular opinion is 
the Court’s extended opposition to prayer in public schools when or-
chestrated by government officials.9  And by some standards we are 
experiencing a politically countercyclical spell right now.10  Even so, 
episodes in which judges contradict mainstream opinion are usually 
like an earlier brand of economic recession:  short and shallow.  To 
state the claim modestly yet confidently, there seem to be no exam-
ples of the Court using supreme law to oppose any central element of 
a governing coalition’s program for an extended period of time, and 
certainly not when sources of conventional legal argument (including 
judicial precedent) plainly pointed the other way.  Not even Dred Scott 
broke this pattern.  Much of the Warren Court’s constitutional work, 
moreover, policed local or regional outlier policies without contra-
dicting anything approaching a national consensus.11 
 
 8 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED 
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 367–76 (2009); 
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 225 (1960); GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:  CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 428–29 
(2d ed. 2008); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:  The Supreme Court as a Na-
tional Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 279–95 (1957); see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levin-
son, The Processes of Constitutional Change:  From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveil-
lance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 501 (2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court tends, in the 
long run, to cooperate with the vector sum of forces in national politics.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).  For opinion polling 
on the question, see Alison Gash & Angelo Gonzales, School Prayer, in PUBLIC OPINION 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 62 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008), finding that a 
majority of Americans have disapproved of the Court’s decision over several decades. 
 10 I am writing in advance of the 2010 elections. 
 11 See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 34–37, 376, 
379–80, 396, 489–94 (2000) (discussing Brown v. Board of Education, Griswold v. Connecticut, 
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Explaining why the pattern of court decisions suggests a main-
stream constraint is challenging, and so is predicting precisely when 
that constraint can be overcome.12  But judicial moderation is consis-
tent with an ineradicably political appointments process.  Even if the 
simple policy preferences of judges explain their decisions, as unre-
constructed attitudinalists suggest,13 the range of judicial preferences 
is shaped by the appointments process beforehand.  Most state judges 
are elected, and neither ACORN nor Tea Party membership is an es-
tablished credential for a federal judgeship.  Within the federal ap-
pointments process, any number of past decisions must be taken as 
settled by nominees hoping for confirmation.  The current list in-
cludes not only Brown, but also Griswold and, not at all ironically, Mar-
bury.  In addition, at least some judges think strategically and hope to 
maintain respect for their judgments.14  Were federal courts to depart 
from their relatively mainstream tradition, they might suffer reprisals 
or disregard, as they sometimes have in the past.15  In view of this real-
ity, judges probably will adopt interpretive methods most likely to 
produce results that are compatible with a mainstream boundary.  To 
the extent that judges are a product of, confined to, and unable to 
influence mainstream opinion, their choice of interpretive method is 
quite inconsequential.  Capping the range of results simultaneously 
caps the stakes of choosing a method to reach those results. 
Now, if the Roberts Court announces that the federal government 
cannot impose a tax on individuals for failing to purchase health in-
surance,16 some observers might look past lasting public opposition to 
 
Gideon v. Wainwright, and Miranda v. Arizona, and identifying a Southern value set as a 
principle loser from judicial review in the 1960s). 
 12 Among the possible explanations for effective exercises of judicial power despite majority 
opposition (aside from issues on which no real majority coalesces) are:  low-intensity op-
position from a popular majority; high-intensity support from an elite minority; holdovers 
in the judiciary from a prior governing coalition who retain some power as part of a new 
settlement; and competing coalitions attempting to delegate certain issues to the courts 
to lower the stakes of politics when rotation in office is foreseen.  On the latter two possi-
bilities and their limits, see Mark Tushnet, Political Power and Judicial Power:  Some Observa-
tions on Their Relation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 755, 759–68 (2006). 
 13 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED 86–97 (2002). 
 14 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). 
 15 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 12–13 (noting “the danger of unaccountable judges 
with the power to interpret the Constitution,” as well as “defiance of judicial decrees” and 
attempts to “exercise control over the courts”). 
 16 A new tax penalty, exceptions, collection restrictions, and congressional findings are lo-
cated in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 
Stat. 119, 242–49 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091).  The tax, assuming it is not 
repealed, will not take effect until 2014. 
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the legislation and reconsider the practical limits on judicial interven-
tion.17  But the Court’s recent track record is not even that bold.  In-
validating flat handgun bans is no evidence of judicial radicalism in 
the United States.18  And the Court’s decision to stand aside when the 
Chrysler bankruptcy plan was challenged is a sign that the post-1937 
model remains in place.  Today the Roberts Court is the most “con-
servative” institution of the federal government.  As a tactical matter, 
I would rather challenge the federal health care law there than seek 
repeal in this Congress, for example.  Yet the Court’s politically coun-
tercyclical force to date can only be described as minimal.  The gen-
eral point is that constraint is a nonissue for judges choosing inter-
pretive methods for constitutional cases, certainly over the long haul.  
Judges are constrained regardless of interpretive method. 
Theoretically, judicial opinions might change nonjudicial opi-
nions, and hence correspondence between judicial views and main-
stream views does not necessarily mean that judges are constrained.  
Similarly, policymakers might adjust to the anticipated objections of 
judges.  I see little evidence, however, that judicial decisions convert 
or deter many people on issues of significance to them.  Among other 
factors, persuasion depends on an audience that listens, that is not 
otherwise convinced, and that stops struggling when judgments are 
rendered.19  But even if judges can influence social life through per-
 
 17 A poll from the spring of 2010 showed support for the overall legislation at 32% and dis-
approval at 53%, most of it strong.  See CBS/New York Times News Poll, 
POLLINGREPORT.COM (Mar. 29–Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.pollingreport.com/
health.htm.  A more recent poll had the overall support figure at 40% and opposition at 
56%.  See CNN/Opinion Research Corp. Poll, POLLINGREPORT.COM (Aug. 6–10, 2010), 
http://www.pollingreport.com/health.htm. (reporting 56% opposition to requiring 
people to have health insurance, but 58% support for requiring insurance companies to 
cover people with pre-existing conditions).  A federal district judge recently denied a mo-
tion to dismiss Virginia’s claim that the tax penalty is invalid.  See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli 
v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010) (memorandum opinion).  The absence 
of a mechanism for achieving something close to universal insurance combined with a 
mandate that insurers cover people with pre-existing conditions is essentially unsustaina-
ble.  Adverse selection would threaten the insurance industry.  So a Supreme Court hold-
ing against the tax penalty easily could prompt the unraveling of other central compo-
nents of the 2010 legislation.  This would indeed make for an important judicial decision, 
whether or not one prefers the result.  But the result would not necessarily buck either 
public opinion or the preferences of political elites. 
 18 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821–22 (2008) (holding that the Dis-
trict of Columbia’s ban on handgun possession in the home violated the Second 
Amendment); Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller:  
Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1043, 1071–72 
(2009) (discussing public and congressional opposition to handgun bans). 
 19 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1830 
(2005) (collecting studies finding little Court influence on public opinion); Jack Citrin & 
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suasion or deterrence, doubt would persist that their choice of inter-
pretive method makes a serious difference in those respects. 
2.  Overlapping Results 
Even assuming judges were unconstrained by any other forces, 
they would nevertheless reach the same interpretive results regardless 
of interpretive method for some number of cases.  Every plausible 
methodological candidate for judicial interpretation of the Constitu-
tion will spit out the conclusion that the President of the United 
States must be at least thirty-five years of age according to the Grego-
rian calendar.  To take a few examples, the conventional contempo-
rary meaning of Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution of 
the United States, as understood by lawyers and everyone else in this 
country who reads it, incorporates the Gregorian dating conventions; 
presumably all versions of originalist inquiry will discover that the dat-
ing conventions were no different in the late eighteenth century on 
the eastern seaboard; a common-law constitutionalist or Burkean tra-
ditionalist will have no interest in disrupting the wide and long-
settled understanding of the age requirement for presidents; and al-
though a contemporary moral reading of the Constitution conceiva-
bly can yield more creative outcomes, it is difficult to find anyone 
who will use that method to go that far.  Indeed, a rough test for the 
propriety of an interpretive method is that the method clearly yields 
the conventional result.  If a presidential candidate aged thirty-four 
according to today’s interpretive and dating conventions were never-
theless declared elected in an otherwise lawful manner, one could 
doubt both the persistence of those conventions and the likelihood 
of judicial intervention. 
This aspect of the age requirement for presidents is one of count-
less points of constitutional law on which a practical consensus holds 
across competing interpretive methods.  They include a president 
with veto power over legislation, a bicameral federal legislature, two 
 
Patrick J. Egan, When the Supreme Court Decides, Does the Public Follow? 2–3 (July 5, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=998597 (finding 
no effect or a small effect on public opinion from learning about the Court’s resistance to 
regulation of abortion, flagburning, and sodomy).  But see Rosalee A. Clawson, Elizabeth 
R. Kegler & Eric N. Waltenburg, The Legitimacy-Conferring Authority of the U.S. Supreme 
Court:  An Experimental Design, 29 AM. POL. RES. 566, 571–72, 580–82 (2001) (testing expe-
rimental-subject opinion effects regarding affirmative action and phone rate regulation).  
The Justices’ influence on public opinion probably will not increase if they mouth disa-
greement with the President at the State of the Union Address, or absent themselves from 
the event altogether.  A more robust communications effort would have to be mounted. 
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senators per state, congressional elections, a supreme court, state 
governments along with a federal government, and so on.  Plainly 
there are debatable questions lurking near the undisputed elements 
of our constitutional system.  But equally certain are the presence of 
rationally indisputable areas of constitutional law subject only to 
classroom play and similar intellectual frolic.  These matters are 
usually not litigated, of course, which obscures the amount of overlap 
among competing interpretive methods.  But what must be taken as 
given in constitutional law can affect the course of argument on con-
testable issues.  Participants may reason from unquestionable propo-
sitions, and viable interpretive methods must leave those propositions 
unquestioned.  In any event, consensus elements of a constitutional 
order surely can be important to social life.  Quiet, persistent agree-
ment in sprawling fields of constitutional law helps belittle disputes 
over how judges ought to interpret the Constitution, and constitu-
tional adjudication in general.20 
3.  Indeterminate Results 
At least occasionally, more than one interpretive method will fail 
to identify a uniquely superior result and will leave open the same set 
of possibilities.  When this is true, the choice between these methods 
is irrelevant to the case at hand.  Notions such as the morally best in-
terpretation, the conventional meaning, the original meaning, re-
spect for judicial precedent, and respect for nonjudicial tradition are 
fairly abstract concepts.  They are sufficiently flexible to permit de-
bate over proper applications in many individual cases.  One does not 
have to be a crit to understand that indeterminacy is a phenomenon 
in legal interpretation.  Some contemporary originalists acknowledge 
that constitutional “interpretation” will sometimes run out and con-
stitutional “construction” can then begin.21  In fact, observers from 
many theoretical camps have portrayed adjudication as encompassing 
both a preferred decision procedure that can end in indeterminacy, 
along with a supplemental decision procedure that is deployed to 
 
 20 Accord NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING ALTERNATIVES IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123, 251 (1994) (contending that courts can address only 
a small fraction of significant policy disputes).  I will discuss the related issue of inconse-
quential court decisions shortly. 
 21 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 118–23 (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999). 
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break ties.22  Resort to such tiebreakers is no surprise within this set-
ting.  The gray areas in which interpretive method cannot provide 
clear answers are more likely to arise in dispute-resolving institutions 
such as judiciaries, insofar as easy questions are less likely selected for 
litigation, less likely to survive settlement efforts, and less likely to be 
appealed.23 
Indeed, there is cause to believe that such indeterminacy is now 
hardwired into the methodological options.  To qualify as a candidate 
method for interpreting the Constitution, it seems that the protocol 
must be fairly abstract.  Obviously the method must provide some 
guidance to count as a method at all.  But lists of preferred outcomes 
for particular constitutional debates are not what real-world propo-
nents of interpretive methods are offering.  Part of what it means to 
offer a method of interpretation is rising above (or maybe just mov-
ing alongside) basal struggles over questions of immediate concern, 
such as who may get married, who may be executed, who is entitled 
to property, and so on.24  However informative, a mere list of out-
comes is bound to be dismissed as improperly results-oriented or in-
adequately designed for new issues or some such.  I do not imagine 
that the outer limit on interpretive method is well marked or well 
reasoned.  But the convention of debate in this field indicates that 
proponents must draft alternatives that are widely applicable to many 
different problems without stipulating outcomes for all or most fore-
seeable disputes.  Particular results may be illustrative, and they may 
suggest integrity through flashy bullet-biting.  They may not consti-
tute “the method” in its entirety.  Whatever the explanation for the 
tradition, it leaves the good-faith operator of each method with a de-
 
 22 See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12 (1921); H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 135–36 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994); Frederick 
Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1729–32 (1988).  On this 
theme, see Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661 (forthcoming 
2010). 
 23 See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–5, 17 (1984); Schauer, supra note 22, at 1722–27 (discussing theoretical 
selection effects on appeals); cf. Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and 
Disputes:  Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW. & SOC’Y. REV. 525, 536–43 (1981) (show-
ing a winnowing process from grievance, to claim, to disputed claim, to the use of lawyers 
and courts).  Empirical challenges to the strongest selection-effect theories include 
Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect:  A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical 
Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990). 
 24 See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 606, 613 (2008) (“Constitutional debate may escalate from particular controversies 
to interpretive method and then to theories of authority without resolving disputes or 
speaking to live questions.”). 
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gree of freedom that allows for overlapping results, and thereby low-
ers the stakes for the choice of method. 
4.  Intolerable Results 
Interpreters will not always have the will to reach the results dic-
tated by their announced methods.  Certain interpretive conclusions 
will impress decision makers as intolerable, even though the interpre-
tive method suggesting those conclusions appeared to be appropriate 
before the fact.  Resistance to the logical implications of an interpre-
tive method can be spun as a regrettable lack of principle—a disap-
pointing weakness when the judge realizes that his method permits 
barbarity while his stomach does not.25  Yet the reappraisal of method 
in light of results is also, for some, the mark of enlightened rationali-
ty—an occasion for revising the method rather than uncritically 
marching into outrageous results.26 
Admirable or not, we should expect judges to jettison their inter-
pretive methods when the results become shocking to them.  And we 
should have this expectation even if the political situation leaves 
them free to adopt or reject what the judge finds shocking.  Blanch-
ing at horrifying outcomes is not always a sign of bad faith, moreover, 
so we need not assume that judges cynically make public commit-
ments to interpretive methods without real effort to follow those 
commitments behind the scenes.  Such false advertising might occur, 
but it is not necessary for the intolerable-results phenomenon to push 
down the stakes of interpretive choice.  Furthermore, at least some 
forward-looking judges might take evasive action when presented 
with certain handcuffing interpretive methods.  They might avoid ex 
ante commitments to any interpretive method that could point to-
ward suicide pacts and regime disintegration.  To date, there appears 
to be little serious empirical investigation into the relationship be-
tween announced interpretive methods and voting patterns or case 
outcomes.27  Experienced observers should nevertheless be skeptical 
 
 25 Cf. Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) (“I can-
not imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that im-
poses the punishment of flogging.”). 
 26 Cf. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS:  A RESTATEMENT 29–33 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (dis-
cussing reflective equilibrium). 
 27 An exceptional effort in this area is Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look 
at Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 130–32 (2002) (finding that text- or intent-based 
arguments in party briefs generally do not predict Justices’ voting behavior as well as 
proxies for judicial ideology).  One hurdle to concluding that interpretive methods affect 
outcomes is the fact that decision makers choose interpretive methods in the first place. 
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that interpretive methods consistently trump otherwise strongly pre-
ferred outcomes. 
5.  Interpretations Without Decisions 
 Many candidate methods of interpretation are not complete me-
thods of decision making.  Some proponents are careful to explain 
that their preferred interpretive methods are designed only to estab-
lish the meaning of legal texts and not to issue broader recommenda-
tions about, say, adjudication.28  Now, to the extent that a judge must 
rely on legal texts to make a decision, an interpretive method is basi-
cally unavoidable.  But we should not be confused into believing that 
any version of originalism, for example, or a moral reading of the 
Constitution comes packaged with a complete set of tools for 
processing litigated cases and issuing judgments therein.  Under-
standing what a legal text means in the abstract is not enough to close 
cases in the particular.  Far more information and evaluation is re-
quired to perform that function.  Other decision-making methods are 
necessary to identify which legal texts are authoritative, to assign 
weights to valid legal sources, to collect other information about the 
dispute, to apply legal norms to the dispute in question, and so on.  
Narrowly defined, then, interpretation is not decision.29 
Not everyone’s definition of “interpretation” is so restrictive.  
Common usage of the term includes, for instance, the application of 
legal norms to particular cases, the consideration of judicial 
precedent regarding meaning, and relevant moral or ethical consid-
erations.30  Thus, many participants in debates over constitutional in-
terpretation by judges are indeed making suggestions about sound 
decision making, not simply assigning meaning to a disembodied le-
gal text.  Advocates of judicial minimalism31 and Thayerian deference 
to legislatures,32 for example, are intensely interested in justifiable 
court decisions.  At the same time, many of these suggestions are 
themselves incomplete.  Minimalism instructs judges to take one 
small step without providing them a direction; Thayerian deference 
 
 28 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1823–24 
(1997). 
 29 See generally Samaha, supra note 24, at 633–34, 675–77 (discussing interpretation, informa-
tion, and decision). 
 30 See Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 268–70. 
 31 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
17, 21 (1999). 
 32 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION ch. 8 (2006). 
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instructs judges to police only clear constitutional violations without 
providing a method for distinguishing clear from unclear violations.  
Even common-law constitutionalism33 and eclectic pragmatism,34 
which are more comprehensive methods or attitudes for judicial de-
cision making, include important flexibilities.  The constitutional 
pragmatist must choose goals before she can “do what works” to 
achieve them, and a common-law constitutionalist must choose nor-
mative commitments if she will test tradition against contemporary 
reason.  In all of these cases, a residual gap exists between method 
and decision.  This decreases the significance of interpretive choice, 
and more so for the less ambitious theories of interpretation. 
6.  Inconsequential Decisions 
There is then the more general phenomenon of unimportance in 
constitutional cases.  A subset of judicial decisions regarding constitu-
tional law is, as far as anyone can really tell, inconsequential.  This is 
not to say that judicial resolution is unneeded within this subset of is-
sues, only that we cannot ascertain with reasonable confidence which 
resolution is better, and regardless which plausible definition of “bet-
ter” that we use.  Some constitutional cases are not demonstrably sig-
nificant much beyond their impact on the parties thereto; other cases 
present options that are difficult to rank order in terms of societal de-
sirability.  Consider the Supreme Court’s declaration in INS v. Chad-
ha35 that legislative vetoes from Congress are unconstitutional.36  Not 
only did this practice survive the Court’s judgment, but I have found 
no solid evidence that real-world policy changed, let alone im-
proved.37  We might say the same about larger-scale design questions 
such as the choice between unicameralism and bicameralism, or pres-
idential and parliamentary systems. 
 
 33 See e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution:  An Essay on Constitutional 
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 572, 577–85 (2001); David A. Strauss, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 904–05, 928–35 (1996). 
 34 See e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS:  PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35–84 (2009); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF 
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 240–65 (1999). 
 35 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 36 See id. at 958–59. 
 37 See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 225 (1988); cf. Jessica Korn, Improv-
ing the Policymaking Process by Protecting the Separation of Powers:  Chadha & the Legislative Ve-
toes in Education Statutes, 26 POLITY 677, 677–80, 687–96 (1994) (finding no clear change 
in policy or power regarding education, but claiming that Congress stabilized certain 
funding decisions, took responsibility for them, and initiated negotiated rulemaking). 
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Surely some constitutional choices matter.  Among the best 
known observations on this score is Amartya Sen’s regarding famine 
as a product of political failure.38  It also might be true that democra-
cies outperform authoritarian regimes in spreading high-quality calo-
ries to especially poor people.39  Food is important.  Yet all too often 
we do not know enough about institutional design, future states of 
the world, or the appropriate ranking of normative goals in a diverse 
and complex society to confidently predict or judge the effects of 
constitutional choices, including any special impact of judicial inter-
vention.  Selection effects in litigation tend to exacerbate such uncer-
tainty, to the extent that courts are working on arguably significant 
constitutional problems.40 
To a degree, this uncertainty is itself unimportant.  A kind of arbi-
trariness or randomness in decision making is acceptable in some de-
cision situations, such as when people with similar interests attempt 
to solve coordination problems.  The precise default date for Con-
gress’s annual initial meeting is a trivial question compared to the 
problems with not establishing any date at all.41  In this domain, how-
ever, choice of interpretive method is unimportant as well.  Any de-
terminative method will do.  The broader observation is that judges’ 
choices of interpretive method can and often will be unimportant 
even if the given constitutional question is crucial, but an unimpor-
tant constitutional question certainly makes for an unimportant in-
terpretive choice.  Only some constitutional issues are truly important 
 
 38 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 51–52, 178–88 (1999) (claiming that, at least 
since World War II, no famine has occurred in a multiparty democracy with elections and 
a free media); see also ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 228 
(2000) (finding life expectancy is longer in democracies, across national per capita in-
come bands); Thomas D. Zweifel & Patricio Navia, Democracy, Dictatorship, and Infant Mor-
tality, 11 J. DEMOCRACY 99, 99 (2000) (asserting democracies have lower infant mortality 
rates at every level of per capita GDP).  But see Michael Ross, Is Democracy Good for the Poor?, 
50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 860, 860, 863–68, 871–72 (2006) (finding, with more countries in the 
data set and some imputed values, that democracies spend more money on public servic-
es but “democracy has little or no effect on infant and child mortality rates”). 
 39 See Lisa Blaydes & Mark Andreas Kayser, Counting Calories:  Democracy and Distribution 
in the Developing World 11–12, 16–18, 26–27 (Aug. 28, 2009) (unpubished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1521472 (using food production and ex-
port/import data to compare countries at similar growth rates, although also finding that 
semi-democratic regimes perform as well as democracies in terms of estimated total aver-
age daily calorie consumption).  The authors recognize the imperfect nature of their 
proxy for food consumption. 
 40 Cf. Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court 2005 Term, Foreword:  The Court’s Agenda—and the 
Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9, 49 (2006) (arguing that most Supreme Court cases deal 
with non-salient, even if sometimes influential, policies). 
 41 See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2.  At least for those who want Congress to continue meet-
ing.  There might be reasonable disagreement on that question. 
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to society, only some of those issues will be litigated, and only some of 
those cases will turn on the choice of interpretive method. 
Finally, all of the above analysis was conducted as if all judges 
would adopt the same interpretive method for all constitutional cas-
es.  This assumption inflates the stakes of methodological debate 
compared to a situation in which methodological diversity will persist 
and the mix of methods can only change modestly in the short run.42  
The latter situation is our reality.  Judges do not appear willing to 
even attempt to agree on a singular and meaningfully constraining 
interpretive method for constitutional cases.  Nor is some other insti-
tution in a position to impose any such method on them.  Asking po-
litely is not likely to have much impact.43  Judges will continue to ex-
hibit differences in interpretive method for the foreseeable future. 
B.  Low Stakes, Not No Stakes 
The foregoing reasons to minimize the significance of constitu-
tional interpretive method in the courts suggest that people of all 
ideological persuasions have relatively little to fear—or hope for—
when it comes to judicial review.  Judges might attempt to desegre-
gate some public schools, but they will not chase Caucasian students 
across all borders.  Judges might retain jurisdiction over Guantánamo 
Bay, but they will not order the immediate release of all detainees.  
Judges are eliminating the handful of existing local handgun bans,44 
but they will not liberate people they do not trust to possess weapons 
that are not normal.45  Judges might use supreme and non-supreme 
law to protect businesses from certain legal claims,46 but they will not 
 
 42 This increased-stakes effect of aggregating judicial choices is true not only in Left/Right 
ideological terms, but also in terms of decision costs.  Some interpretive methods (e.g., 
crude textualism with crude tiebreakers for close cases) might be substantially cheaper to 
operate than other methods (e.g., purpose-driven inquiries supplemented by legislative 
history and predicted consequences), even with the selection effects of litigation. 
 43 See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1998) (observ-
ing that “judges, with only a few exceptions, are put off by [normative] constitutional 
theory” propounded by academics). 
 44 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821–22 (2008) (declaring invalid the 
District’s prohibition on handgun possession in the home); see also McDonald v. Chicago, 
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (plurality opinion) (holding that Second Amendment 
rights, whatever they are, are enforceable against state and local action through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 45 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17 (gratuitously providing a non-exhaustive list of presump-
tively valid firearms regulations). 
 46 See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (involving preemption); Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (involving pleading rules); State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (involving punitive damages); Lorillard Tobac-
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seriously interfere with the administration’s efforts to revive the eco-
nomic system.  Bailouts, stimulus packages, paper money, and the 
Federal Reserve Board are safe. 
On the other hand, this interpretive choice is a low-stakes deci-
sion, not a zero-stakes decision.  External and internal constraints 
leave some areas for judicial discretion.  Different interpretive me-
thods are sometimes outcome-determinative and divergent.  The out-
come will sometimes be of interest to people beyond parties to a law-
suit, and the interests of the parties themselves count for something.  
Moreover, a judge cannot work without an interpretive method.  Le-
gal texts are neither self-explanatory nor self-enforcing.  They are in-
animate.  Like anyone else, a judge needs a way to understand the 
meaning of relevant legal sources.  Correct (or more persuasive) an-
swers are better than incorrect (or less persuasive) answers, even if 
error costs are low. 
Furthermore, concluding that the stakes are low arrives with com-
plications.  Among them is the decision to plug in a value set for de-
termining what counts as important, as well as a way to compare the 
influence of interpretive method with other determinants of judicial 
decisions.  Cases such as Chadha might turn out to be unimportant to 
nearly everyone in retrospect, but a highly diverse population will ex-
perience persistent disagreement and idiosyncratic priorities.  For 
some people, reaching the correct interpretation of a legal text might 
be their highest calling, regardless of any other consequence.  In ad-
dition, collecting likely influences on constitutional judgments does 
not by itself establish the insignificance of interpretive method.  The 
appointments process, the ideological composition of the judiciary, 
the threat of retaliation from other institutions, the inability of inter-
pretive choice to dictate unique and differing results, the limited im-
pact of some constitutional decisions, and other factors reviewed 
above do not eliminate the potential impact of interpretive method.  
There probably are more precise ways to measure the relative signi-
ficance of interpretive choice.  The combination of arguments of-
fered above, however, should be enough to establish, at a minimum, 
that it is reasonable to seriously doubt the importance of interpretive 
choice in driving outcomes for a sizable number of constitutional 
cases important to social life. 
To be clear, this is not a recommendation that everyone discard 
constitutional litigation in general or methodological debate in par-
 
co Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (involving commercial advertising); see also Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (involving expert testimony). 
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ticular.  Nonjudicial institutions are often ineffectual on their own, 
too.  Think about Congress and Iraq war policy, or traffic police and 
double parking.  The revolution probably will not happen at all.  For 
more modest projects, constitutional litigation will sometimes be a 
party’s best hope.  And judges’ choice of interpretive method, which 
is influenced by outsiders through the appointments process if not 
elsewhere, can have at least modest effects on modest projects.  For 
these reasons, one side to a controversy should not automatically and 
unilaterally disarm themselves of the constitutional litigation option 
or of opportunities to influence the character of our judiciaries.  
These efforts can be part of a formidable array of tactics aimed at 
multiple institutions, both public and private. 
Finally, judicial decisions and the choice of interpretive method 
for constitutional cases are important beyond the realm of particular 
results in court.  Judicial decisions can start broader discussions about 
the content of supreme law.  In addition, a judge’s chosen interpre-
tive method can tell us something about how that judge perceives her 
role in society or, more narrowly, what she believes is a legitimate way 
to present that role.  Significant for my purposes, selecting an inter-
pretive brand may be seen as an association with a set of results that 
are favored or disfavored by large numbers of observers.  This has 
implications for the judicial appointments process and other public 
relations issues, a point to which I will return in the pages that follow. 
So someone ought to keep thinking about interpretive method.  
But the open questions include “who, how many, and how much?”  
And the possible answers include “not me, not many, and not much.” 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISIONS AND DEBATES 
Below, I offer thoughts on low-stakes decisions and debates.  Ap-
parently, there is no canonical work on the subject, which might not 
be surprising given what one can say off the cuff about the signific-
ance of low-stakes decision making.  Actually, a critic might think that 
the subject is too trivial to be worth the words written below.  But we 
face countless low-stakes decisions throughout our lives.  A little 
guidance on how people do or should approach them all probably 
adds up to a worthwhile contribution.  And I promise that the discus-
sion will remain concise and relatively superficial. 
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A.  Low Stakes, Generally Speaking 
1.  Lower Decision Costs Expended, Higher Error Rates Tolerated 
The armchair logic of decision costs is a good place to begin.  De-
cision making is itself costly, even when the decision is correct with-
out doubt.  This is self-evident from everyone’s experience with 
group decisions.  A sound architecture for rational decision making 
will take into account decision costs (and benefits) along with error 
costs (and correctness benefits).  Because decisions always come with 
decision costs, decision makers have reason to be frugal in designing 
their decision procedures, despite a higher risk of error.47 
These are obvious points, but they indicate a basic lesson for iden-
tifiably low-stakes decisions.  If the range of possible outcomes from a 
decision is narrow and includes only insignificant results—ranging 
from mildly pleasant to a little annoying—then the decision maker 
can afford to be relatively less careful, even careless, in reaching a 
conclusion.  There is no sense in throwing research, thought, discus-
sion, and other resources into a decision that will not make much dif-
ference to anyone anyway.  We should expect rational people to re-
duce decision costs and the degree of care taken when they perceive 
low stakes, and we might recommend that people behave in just this 
way.  We should also expect more errors, somehow defined. 
Consistent with these expectations, some experiments show that 
performance-based rewards incentivize participants to increase effort 
and accuracy.  For instance, paid subjects might observe more care-
fully and thereby enhance their ability to recall information.48  We 
can think of increasing financial incentives as increasing the stakes 
for good as opposed to poor performance.  It should be noted, how-
ever, that financial-incentive effects are situation-sensitive.  Incentives 
are sometimes ineffective and can backfire.49  Increased incentives 
might have no effect when participants are already intrinsically moti-
vated to perform at a certain level, or when the task is so easy or so 
difficult that participant effort levels become sticky.  Worsening per-
formance can result when participants become overly excited by the 
pressure of high stakes, or when they over-think decision problems.  
In one study, subjects who were paid a little money to accurately pre-
 
 47 See generally Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 604, 616 (2006). 
 48 See Colin F. Camerer & Robin N. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments:  
A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8, 14, 16, 
tbl.1 (1999). 
 49 See id. at 8, 19–23, 34–36. 
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dict which students would receive honors more often departed from 
a simple formula that was known to be correct 70% of the time.  
Those subjects performed a bit worse than the formula would have.50 
2.  Higher Settlement Rates, When the Decision Makers Must Interact 
A related prediction involves compromise.  We should expect 
more of it when people facing the same question must interact with 
each other and each perceive that not much turns on the answer.  In 
these situations, the participants can save each other the costs of ad-
ditional debate by conceding certain points and splitting other dif-
ferences.  This is a familiar thought from investigations into the selec-
tion effects of litigation.  Simple models of settlement indicate that 
settlement chances are higher when the costs of litigating increase 
relative to the stakes perceived by the parties, and that asymmetric 
stakes increase the chance of one party wanting to litigate rather than 
settle.51  Whether or not disputants usually follow these rationalist 
models of behavior, the idea is plainly attractive as a normative mat-
ter.  Relatively cheap capitulation can be better than expensive con-
testation. 
3.  Perhaps More Frequent Risk-Taking and Greater Trust 
The next observation comes from a growing set of experimental 
studies on the effect of stake size.  Testing external validity is often 
the motivation behind these experiments:  no-effect findings are a re-
lief for many experimenters, whose other results may leave doubts 
that subjects take laboratory games seriously when the potential 
payoffs are measly.  Hypothetical or nominal payoffs are the most 
many experimenters can afford to offer.  But if stake size does not af-
fect behavior, then cheap experiments might be adequate.  Regard-
less of the correct position on the external validity controversy, we are 
interested in evidence of how people behave relative to stake size. 
Some notable studies find that lower stakes are associated with 
lower levels of risk aversion, or at least greater variance in risk aver-
 
 50 See Hal R. Arkes, Robyn M. Dawes & Caryn Christensen, Factors Influencing the Use of a Deci-
sion Rule in a Probabilistic Task, 37 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 93, 107–08 
(1986); see also Robert H. Ashton, Pressure and Performance in Accounting Decision Settings:  
Paradoxical Effects of Incentives, Feedback, and Justification, 28 J. ACCOUNT. RES. 148, 148–49, 
157–61 (1990) (finding that incentives, feedback, and justification requirements led to 
lower average accuracy and higher variance in predicting Moody’s bond ratings when 
subjects competing against each other for prizes were given an optional formula). 
 51 See, e.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 23, at 4–5. 
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sion levels.  In an early experiment, farmers in India were given mon-
ey to play a series of lotteries run by the experimenters.52  As the po-
tential payouts increased, the least risk-averse contingents shrank.  
For instance, more than 18% of the sample preferred an even-
chances gamble of gaining either nothing or gaining 4 rupees over 
other even-chances gambles with less variance and higher low 
payouts, but that fraction fell to under 2% when the largest spread 
was instead either nothing or 200 rupees.53  A more contemporary 
study offered Georgia State students gambles for payouts ranging 
from pennies to over $300.  The experimenters came to similar con-
clusions.  The fraction of participants taking the relatively safe gam-
bles (that is, gambles with higher floors and lower ceilings) increased 
as the potential payouts increased.54 
Other experiments study behavior in more social settings.  One 
recent effort associates lower stakes with higher levels of trust or wil-
lingness to cooperate.  Residents of rural Bangladesh were given vari-
ous sums of money and the choice to send some part of it to a stran-
ger-recipient; any amount sent would be tripled before it reached the 
recipient, and then the recipient was given the choice to send some 
part of that amount back to the sender.  Senders consistently sent 
positive amounts, but they sent a larger fraction of the money when 
they were given less to send:  55% of the total was sent on average 
when the stakes were relatively low, compared to 46% when the stakes 
were medium and only 38% when high.55  We might say that the risk-
taking findings are similar to the trust-elevating findings.  Both beha-
viors involve chance-taking in a sense, and both might logically be re-
lated to low stakes.  Another explanation involves a desire for drama 
 
 52 See Hans P. Binswanger, Attitudes Toward Risk:  Experimental Measurement in Rural India, 62 
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 395, 396–400, 406 (1980). 
 53 See id. at 399 tbl. 3 (showing fractions choosing the “Neutral to Negative” gamble for the 
first 0.5 rupee game and for the 50 rupee game); id. at 396–97 & tbl.1 (explaining the 
stakes and spreads). 
 54 See Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 
1644, 1647, 1653–54 (2002) (finding increasing relative risk aversion and decreasing ab-
solute risk aversion as real stakes rise, and stressing different results when subjects are 
presented merely hypothetical choices without actual money payoffs). 
 55 See Olof Johansson-Stenman, Minhaj Mahmud & Peter Martinsson, Does Stake Size Matter in 
Trust Games?, 88 ECON. LETTERS 365, 367–68 & tbls.1 & 2 (2005) (noting that amount 
sent also increases with income).  The highest sum given to senders was 4.8% of per capi-
ta GNI.  See id. at 366; see also Connel Fullenkamp, Rafael Tenorio & Robert Battalio, As-
sessing Individual Risk Attitudes Using Field Data from Lottery Games, 85 REV. ECON. & STATS. 
218, 219, 224–26 (2003) (studying television game show contestant behavior and finding 
increasing risk aversion as stakes rise, but also that the most rational players are compara-
tively more likely to take large gambles). 
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or avoidance of monotony.  Perhaps these phenomena help explain 
more erratic decision patterns when stakes are low.56 
To be clear, not every experiment concludes that stakes matter.  
Several find no significant difference in player behavior when stakes 
are varied in certain types of dictator games, ultimatum games, and 
public goods games.57  At least in these settings, players are not ap-
preciably changing their willingness to share surpluses or contribute 
to mutually beneficial projects when the maximum payoffs change.  
Furthermore, we can imagine situations in which high stakes prompt 
the participants to pull together and collaborate in the best interests 
of all.  If each participant thinks of him or herself as a member of the 
same team, rather than strangers or competitors, we should expect 
higher levels of sharing, trust, and cooperation for their common 
good.58  Nevertheless, we can draw overall impressions from the expe-
rimental studies, and be on the lookout for riskier, more trusting, 
and perhaps more generous behavior when stakes are low, especially 
in otherwise competitive or adversarial settings. 
4.  Perhaps Less Capable Participants, When People May Select High or 
Low Stakes 
A fourth and final observation will not be flattering to those who 
plan to continue writing about methods of constitutional interpreta-
tion, but there is logic behind it.  The idea is that high-stakes games 
will attract relatively sophisticated, intelligent, and resourceful partic-
ipants.  Low-stakes games presumably will attract the opposite set.  It 
 
 56 See Camerer & Hogarth, supra note 48, at 24. 
 57 See, e.g., Martin G. Kocher, Peter Martinsson & Martine Visser, Does Stake Size Matter for 
Cooperation and Punishment?, 99 ECON. LETTERS 508, 510–11 (2008) (public goods games 
with South African high school students) (finding no significant effect of stakes on mean 
or variance in contributions); see also Jeffrey Carpenter, Eric Verhoogen & Stephen Burks, 
The Effect of Stakes in Distribution Experiments, 86 ECON. LETTERS 393, 394–96 (2005) (ulti-
matum and dictator games with Middlebury College students) (finding no significant ef-
fect of stakes from $10 to $100 on average offers or allocations, although allocations fell 
as income rose and siblings increased).  But cf. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, What Do 
Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?, 21 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 153, 164–65 (2007) (acknowledging mixed results for the theory that financial 
concerns will increase compared to morality concerns as stakes rise); Robert Slonim & Al-
vin E. Roth, Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games:  An Experiment in the Slovak Republic, 
66 ECONOMETRICA 569, 589–91 (1998) (finding a high-stakes effect emerging as players 
gained experience). 
 58 I have been told by Albie Sachs that the South African Constitutional Court operated this 
way in its early years after the fall of Apartheid.  Apparently, judges on the Court worked 
collaboratively even when there was disagreement, understanding that the stakes sur-
rounding foundational judgments were relatively high. 
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could be that participating in a high-stakes interactive setting is 
known to be a costlier endeavor warranting greater investment in the 
decisions and greater amounts of insurance for bad outcomes.  To 
the extent that high-stakes games are perceived as not only risky but 
also resource intensive, those with the resources will participate more 
often than others. 
On the other hand, the games that a person chooses to play might 
depend on her expectations about what everyone else will choose, 
and those expectations might not be easily predicted.  In addition, 
some people are overly confident or overly modest about their own 
abilities, and some people prefer the challenge of attempting to 
punch above their weight while others are happy to dominate lesser 
lights.  To the extent that playing a high-stakes game fosters a reputa-
tion for sophistication, moreover, even unsophisticated players might 
join for status, respect, or signaling purposes.  Hence there need not 
be a strong correlation between participant ability and stakes. 
Unfortunately, past practice in experimental research often had 
the experimenters selecting participants for games with particular 
stakes instead of allowing participants to opt in or out.  We know less 
than we should about how people decide whether to participate in 
low- or high-stakes games. 
We can nonetheless make a few reasonably intelligent generaliza-
tions about low-stakes behavior—many of them descriptive or posi-
tive, some tinged with normative recommendation.  Substantial evi-
dence indicates that low-stakes decisions are associated with low levels 
of effort and more errors, which is defensible from a modern ratio-
nalist perspective.  Within social settings, many people will be more 
willing to settle their differences and to take risks and trust each oth-
er somewhat more often when the stakes are low.  And within dynam-
ic settings that allow for selection in and out, it is possible that rela-
tively less sophisticated and less resourceful people will stick to low- 
stakes situations while others will migrate to higher-stakes controver-
sies. 
B.  Debates over Interpretive Method 
What then might be said about ongoing debates over the proper 
method of constitutional interpretation for the courts?  It is possible, 
albeit tricky, to offer strong global recommendations. 
The first suggestion is that worry over judicial constraint should 
not fuel the debates.  One of the traditional motivations for vetting 
methods of interpretation for constitutional cases is the fear that the 
absence of method means the beginning of judicial dictatorship, or at 
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least judicial usurpation of policy territory more appropriately as-
signed to other institutions.  If they will not sign on to a particular 
method, the argument runs, they will be free to dominate the rest of 
us in ways that we would rather avoid.  
The problem for this argument is that judges are already seriously 
constrained before they begin to think about interpretive method, 
and those who do adopt something recognizable as interpretive me-
thod are not demonstrably constrained to the extent envisioned by 
the proponents of such constraints.  Even if every judge determined 
to “do justice as I see fit,” unbridled by a coherent interpretive me-
thod, the judiciary would remain constrained by internal and exter-
nal forces—beginning with the appointments process and ending 
with feasibility limits on courts’ ability to influence social, economic, 
and political systems of which they are one small part.  Again, this is 
not to say that judges can decide cases without an interpretive me-
thod, however implicit or parsimonious.  It is to say that worry about 
judicial constraint need not greatly increase the urgency of judges 
choosing sides.59 
A related recommendation is that the temperature of these de-
bates ought to be turned down, perhaps to absolute zero.  If the rele-
vant stakes involve court decisions in constitutional cases, and if im-
portant constitutional cases are not importantly influenced by 
interpretive method, then those interested in societal well-being 
probably should want resources devoted to more pressing matters.  
Strenuous and costly investigations should be avoided if the outcome 
cannot make much difference.  Participants in the field of constitu-
tional interpretive method might then relax, enjoy each other’s com-
pany, consider a compromise, and experiment with creative or even 
arguably outrageous solutions to methodological questions.  Indeed, 
many potential participants should stay out of the field or exit if they 
are currently laboring in it, taking into consideration their other op-
tions, of course. 
True, if potential participants think or act this way, the quality of 
work on interpretive method will be shoddier and less disciplined by 
the efforts of the most capable minds.  We might not see another 
work on the order of Ely’s Democracy and Distrust or Bickel’s The Least 
 
 59 An even worse version of the constraint argument is that the need for constraint indicates 
that judges ought to adopt a particular interpretive method, such as some version of ori-
ginalism.  Every method of interpretation and decision making presents constraints.  A 
need for judicial constraint is not an especially productive way of choosing among me-
thods.  See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 156 n.31 (2d ed. 2005) 
(noting that judges could objectively constrain themselves by flipping coins). 
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Dangerous Branch, or with the brevity and insight of Dahl’s Decision-
Making in a Democracy or Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial Process.  
Whichever past works should be on the list of foundational contribu-
tions, they might well be adequate to our needs for the foreseeable 
future.  Perhaps the field of constitutional interpretation has already 
suffered from a diversion of high-quality mental and other resources 
to other projects.  (I will not say that my work in the field proves oth-
erwise.)  Whether it has begun already or not, some diversion seems 
sensible. 
In fact, a series of affiliated subjects might rightly attract a refugee 
from the field.  First of all, there is the question of best methods for 
constitutional decision making in courts, which is often broader than 
the determination of interpretive method, along with the even more 
inclusive question about proper methods of judicial decision making 
full stop.  Judicial decisions regarding sub-supreme law could be 
where the real action is, where judges have significant day-to-day im-
pact on a large number of low-salience “cold-button” issues, despite 
the theoretical possibilities of legislative response.  On the same track 
are questions regarding models of judicial behavior.  Whether de-
scriptively or normatively, the general goals and functions of courts in 
our society and over time could be better specified and explained.  
For instance, appointed judges obviously serve a politically counter-
cyclical function on certain occasions and for certain issues.  Many of 
us believe that this function is usually modest and more likely when 
other political forces are not fully united, but we might better under-
stand precisely when and within which policy domains it is most likely 
to occur.  Investigators are still pinpointing forces internal and exter-
nal to legal institutions that produce law’s character.  With respect to 
the recent past, we already can do better than refer to “the hidden 
voices of the zeitgeist,”60 but there is considerable room for progress. 
These are broad suggestions, and they are quite crude.  More de-
tail is needed to go further in normative or positive directions, be-
cause understanding the implications of stake size requires under-
standing the details of a particular decision situation or debate.  The 
specific situation will affect whether and which participants perceive 
the stakes as low or high, whether and which participants are sensitive 
to stake size, and whether and which participants have reason to 
change their practices.  One needs to know what kind of game (if 
any) participants believe that they are playing.  When it comes to the 
 
 60 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA:  A SHORT HISTORY 42 (2002) (describing influ-
ences on nineteenth-century judges, which is a particularly challenging task). 
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method of constitutional interpretation by judges, there are a variety 
of discussions taking place.  In the closing paragraphs, I will simplify 
matters and present a few comments on academics, politicians, and 
judges who might engage in these discussions. 
1.  Academics as Low-Stakes Specialists 
The foregoing might indicate that scholars ought to exit the field 
en masse.  Indeed, there is a valid concern about overexertion here.  
For instance, and in my opinion, a troubling conceptual turn has oc-
curred in one part of the debate over constitutional interpretation by 
judges.  More than one academic has declared that interpretation just 
is one thing or another, and that those who fail to engage in the spe-
cified practice cannot claim to be interpreting anything.61  In its worst 
form, this line of analysis is a taunt playing on a rough public consen-
sus that judges may “interpret” but not “make” law.  If someone could 
control the definition of interpretation, they might claim victory in 
the debates over proper judicial behavior.  But no real victory will be 
achieved in this way.  Different scholars define interpretation diffe-
rently, the relevant concepts are sometimes complicated moving tar-
gets, and it is not yet evident that anyone has changed their position 
on how judges should interpret legal texts based on these conceptual 
arguments.  Esoteric academic debates of this character seem to be 
heading nowhere, and to be proceeding without cognizance of the 
limited potential impact of any interpretive protocol in the judiciary.  
At a minimum, concerned onlookers should hope that scholars who 
remain in the field will understand the realistic constraints on judicial 
outcomes when they devise and recommend interpretive methods for 
that institution.62 
Other events might be signs of sensitivity to low stakes among aca-
demics, however.  A notable development is Jack Balkin’s announce-
ment that he is an originalist.63  More than one explanation for this 
 
 61 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 28, at 1823–24; Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 3–4 
(Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 (looking for original public meaning); see also Stanley 
Fish, Intention Is All There Is:  A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive Interpretation in 
Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1112, 1114 (2008) (asserting that finding authorial inten-
tion is interpretation, but that the concept lacks guidance for how to ascertain it). 
 62 Of course criticisms like this are not restricted to constitutional interpretation.  One 
might say that academics are habitually engaged in low-stakes inquiries, at least the ones 
who follow their fancy and lack an implementation strategy for their ideas. 
 63 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292 
(2007) (“In this essay I offer an argument for the right to abortion based on the original 
meaning  of the constituional text . . . .”). 
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development can be spun out, and I cannot speak authoritatively on 
the subject.  But one possible account of Balkin’s public conversion is 
that he understood that choosing an interpretive method for the 
Constitution is a matter of little significance to issue outcomes.  
Whether or not he was in a conciliatory, trusting, and generous state 
of mind at the time, his adoption of the originalist brand has had no 
perceptible influence on the results he would reach in particular cas-
es.  Balkin has attempted to show that one can support judicially en-
forceable abortion rights after declaring allegiance to originalism writ 
large,64 that the New Deal regulatory and welfare state is consistent 
with the Constitution’s original meaning,65 and that contemporary 
civil rights legislation comports with the original meaning of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.66  Indeed Balkin 
claims that his version of originalism is compatible with living consti-
tutionalism, and at least one other scholar has suggested a kind of 
détente using the device of constitutional construction.67 
Balkin’s adoption of originalism illustrated the flexibility under-
neath the label, and for all we know he intended to push the original-
ist school toward indeterminacy and meaninglessness.  No one is able 
to exclude Balkin from the club.  If other self-proclaimed originalists 
try to purge him for finding that the Constitution includes an abor-
tion right or for some other result on a contested issue of supreme 
law, they risk losing their claim to a bona fide constitutional method 
in the first place.68  And if he stays on the list, membership might not 
even signal much about the ex ante commitments to particular re-
sults of those who select into the club.  A decision to argue in origi-
nalist terms does say something, perhaps about the acceptable rhetor-
ic of constitutional debate in the twenty-first century United States; 
Balkin’s announcement might be taken as a concession on this score.  
But the decision says less than it might insofar as originalists can be 
pro-choice or not, accepting of health insurance mandates or not, or 
convinced that the regulation of private discrimination is constitu-
tional or not.  Thus interpretive theorists in the academy may be crit-
 
 64 See id. 
 65 See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce 4–5 (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 206, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553002. 
 66 See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power 5–6 (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper 
No. 207, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1558749. 
 67 See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
923, 934 (2009).  There is no settled method for constitutional construction, nor agree-
ment on which institutions should perform it. 
 68 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
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icized for overkill and, at the same time, there are grounds for believ-
ing that their attention is changing at the margins. 
Before leaving this subtopic, however, I want to show support for a 
measure of academic preoccupation with constitutional interpreta-
tion.  Exploration of ideas by a group of scholars unmoved by the 
perceived stakes for the rest of society can be part of a healthy system.  
A society dedicated to self-criticism and progress should preserve 
spaces for unrealistic dreaming.  Much of what makes judicial inter-
pretation of the Constitution a low-stakes matter involves feasibility 
constraints that one can imagine becoming weaker.  Academics have 
the luxury of considering such eventualities.  Indeed it might be use-
ful to have such thinking taking place in advance of any constitution-
al crisis that could be solved through sensible and sophisticated in-
terpretive techniques developed outside the halls of ordinary politics.  
In addition, sometimes “more is more,” despite the inability to fully 
achieve an objective.  An interpretive method might accomplish some 
good if some decision makers follow the method only some of the 
time. 
Finally, academia is arguably the best location for individuals to 
exert shockingly high levels of effort investigating creative solutions 
to problems considered unimportant by others.  This is true even 
apart from any soothing effect on the intellectual class (a low-minded 
if practical goal) and from any objective good that uninhibited intel-
lectual inquiry can achieve (a high-minded if controversial goal).  
There is additional social value from the exercise.  Following whim, a 
single academic can help solve low-stakes problems faced repeatedly 
by many other people.  On this basis we can appreciate the treatise 
writer, who might catch a sneer from colleagues at prestigious law 
schools, as well as the implausible suggestions of half-cocked high 
theorists.  Consider recent claims that interpreters should ask what 
the text meant to “a fully informed public audience, knowing all that 
there is to know about the Constitution and the surrounding world,”69 
or that a dramatically more amateurish version of originalism can be 
justified as a politically correct substitute for randomization in certain 
closely contested cases.70  The outrageousness or relative insignific-
ance of academic arguments is, I hope, not an effective condemna-
tion.  In any event, a dedicated scholar might be making his or her 
 
 69 Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002). 
 70 See Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1354–64 
(2008). 
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best contribution by grappling with a question generally thought to 
have no immediate value to societal well-being. 
2.  Politicians Appointing Judges 
The positive and normative picture is quite different once we 
move away from the academy.  Outsiders do have difficulty measuring 
the seriousness with which politicians and associated interest groups 
take the question of interpretive method in constitutional cases.  But 
my impression is that particular results are much more important to 
these actors than the choice of interpretive method, especially when 
the method in question is the least bit abstract.  We can know little 
about the behind-the-scenes vetting process for judges within the ex-
ecutive branch, or the negotiations among senators, interest groups, 
and the White House.  The public debate over federal judicial nomi-
nees, however, often has little to do with confrontations over inter-
pretive method.  Recent confirmation struggles included plenty of 
discussion about particular cases or lines of doctrine, the possibility of 
super-precedents, and nominee character, background, and tempe-
rament.  Full scale sparring over living constitutionalism or some ver-
sion of originalism is usually absent. 
This is not always true.  Many critics of the Warren Court (which 
seems to include the early Burger Court) packaged their objections 
under the heading “Original Intent,” and Attorney General Edwin 
Meese adopted that label as an organizing idea for evaluating the 
Court and nominees thereto.71  In addition, the confirmation process 
for Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court ultimately 
helped to generate some debate on interpretive method.  But even 
the Bork hearings were not dominated by anything as theoretical as 
proper methods of constitutional interpretation.  At least equally im-
portant were questions about particular decisions, particular issues, 
particular doctrines, as well as Bork’s ideology and temperament.72  
Politicians, interest groups, and others wanted to know where Bork 
stood on key issues that many considered settled or that otherwise 
threatened one group or another.  To the extent that identification 
with an interpretive method can be translated into a nominee’s 
 
 71 See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice:  The Right’s Living Constitu-
tion, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 555–56 (2006); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 603–13 (2004). 
 72 See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE:  HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK 
AMERICA 220–27, 347–51 (1989) (noting the salience of particular civil rights and privacy 
norms, along with a broader struggle over the Reagan administration’s legal agenda). 
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stance on such issues, because such method has already been affi-
liated with a particular set of results, method choices will attract some 
attention.  It is difficult to avoid the feeling that much of the debate 
over constitutional interpretation during our lifetime has been ani-
mated by the participants’ positions on Roe v. Wade.  This is not, how-
ever, evidence that participants in the nomination and confirmation 
process care about interpretive method for reasons other than pre-
dictive power.  And more recent confirmation proceedings display 
even less care for a nominee’s supposed method of interpreting the 
Constitution.  To put it mildly, Sonia Sotomayor was not required to 
deliver an illuminating disquisition on the matter.73  Nor was Elena 
Kagan’s repeated statement, “It’s law all the way down,”74 especially 
informative. 
This is understandable.  Appointing officials are not boxed into 
answering low-stakes questions regarding interpretive method, and 
they have good reason to shift their attention elsewhere.  The nomi-
nation and confirmation of judges involve practical considerations 
regarding who should staff the judiciary.  These processes depend on 
reliable information about the likely performance of potential judges, 
including whether a candidate might use the office so as to threaten 
the foremost interests of the officials involved and their constituen-
cies.  Again, court decisions in general, and constitutional judicial re-
view in particular, can affect the rest of social life, and their modern 
mainstream judgments usually are not openly repudiated by other of-
ficials.  Wild-eyed, corrupt, slothful, or even patsy judges could 
threaten the basic settlement on the magnitude of federal judicial 
 
 73 See, e.g., Sotomayor Hearings:  The Complete Transcript, Part 1, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at 5, 
available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/07/sonia-sotomayor-
hearing-transcript.html (“[I]n every case that I render, I first decide what the law requires 
under the facts before me, and then what I do is explain to litigants why the law requires 
a result.”). 
 74 She offered more than that, of course.  See, e.g., Sen. Patrick J. Leahy Holds a Hearing on the 
Elena Kagan Nomination:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 101 
(2010) (statement of Elena Kagan, Nominee to the Supreme Court) (“I think that judges 
are always constrained by the law. . . . [S]ometimes the text speaks clearly and then 
they’re constrained by the text alone.  Where the text doesn’t speak clearly, they look to 
other sources of law.  They look to original intent, they look to continuing history and 
traditions.  They look to precedent and the principles embodied in those precedent.  But 
they’re always constrained by the law.  It’s law all the way down.”); see id. at 23 (“[I]n gen-
eral, judges should look to a variety of sources when they interpret the Constitution, and 
which take precedence in a particular case is really a kind of case-by-case thing. . . . And I 
would look at this very practically and very pragmatically . . . .”); see also Sen. Patrick J. Leahy 
Holds a Hearing on the Elena Kagan Nomination Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 102 (2010) (statement of Elena Kagan, Nominee to the Supreme Court) (“It’s not 
personal views.  It’s not moral views.  It’s not political views.  It’s law all the way down.”). 
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power in the United States.  But by now it should be understandable 
when an official charged with vetting potential judges shows little in-
terest in using a candidate’s professed interpretive method to sepa-
rate good from bad judges, except as a proxy for a likely pattern of 
results conventionally associated with that method.  Even then, no-
minating and appointing officials can reasonably believe that the 
most extreme results will not come to pass, and should have little 
faith that interpretive method on its own will help predict results not 
already identified as the product of the method.  These officials are 
not scholars, and we should neither expect nor hope that they ex-
pend as much effort playing with the concepts and toying with the 
possibilities for interpretive methods. 
3.  Judges Deciding Cases 
In some ways, judicial dealings with interpretive method are more 
like the politics of the appointments process and less like a sympo-
sium of constitutional theorists.  For all that we can tell from judicial 
opinions, many judges skate by without stopping to make serious 
commitments to one interpretive method over another.  As I have 
said, at least an implicit interpretive method is necessary to decide 
cases in which a legal text is relevant, but this does not mean that 
judges must ponder, let alone negotiate over, the proper method.  
Most of them seem to do no such thing.  In fact, because certain me-
thods of constitutional interpretation are still associated with particu-
lar patterns of results in controversial policy areas, choosing among 
these interpretive options will almost invariably affiliate that judge 
with those particular commitments.  For many judges, this will show 
the observing public more ideological rigidity than they actually have 
or wish to display. 
There are notable exceptions.  Justice Scalia contributed to a fairly 
famous volume on statutory and constitutional interpretation,75 and 
he is no stranger to the lecture circuit.  Justice Breyer recently fol-
lowed up with a short book76 and public appearances of his own.  But 
these two Justices are among the outliers.  Nor does it seem unfair to 
observe that they are both former academics.  There is not a wide-
spread expectation that each judge will stake out a comprehensive 
 
 75 See  generally Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of the United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 76 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:  INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005). 
Dec. 2010] CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 335 
 
position on interpretive method, and the few judges who attempt to 
do so are outnumbered by their more casual colleagues.  For every 
Brennan, there must be twenty O’Connors.  At least some of those 
twenty must believe that interpretive method is not especially out-
come-determinative in cases that matter to judges, and that the li-
mited time in which they have to close live cases affecting the lives of 
real parties is better directed toward other tasks.  The irreducible ob-
ligations of a dispute-resolving job should produce sympathy for any 
failure on the part of sitting judges to treat the methodological ques-
tions surrounding legal interpretation with intellectual rigor. 
Now, the foregoing does risk miscalculating the true stakes in-
volved for judges.  Judges do face charges of lawlessness, especially 
when they play with supreme law.  If a method of analysis is not for-
mally announced, and if the results produce intense opposition on 
the part of some, as many decisions will, then the displeased will chal-
lenge not only the results but also the legitimacy of the process.  
People will question whether those judges are really doing law.  A 
fairly predictable pattern of results probably will not be adequate to 
eliminate these complaints; it has not done so in the past.  One might 
come to believe that adopting a (perhaps any) method of interpreta-
tion is a necessity for judges, whether or not they believe that their 
decisions will be dictated by that choice. 
My final observation is to return to the starting point, which is 
mainstream politics.  Judges, even judges appointed for life, are 
members of the government and a political regime.  They are a 
product of that system.  And so in many situations, judges can effec-
tively trust that system to have placed them in a position where they 
are unlikely to fail.  In other words, the fact of sitting on the bench is 
an indication that the gavel will be wielded in politically acceptable 
ways.  If there was not much clamor for dedications to interpretive 
method during the appointments process, there is some basis for be-
lieving that post-judgment complaints of lawlessness are more about 
the judgment than the method.  All of this is obviously too simplistic.  
Often there are long temporal gaps between appointment and con-
troversy, and judicial stature is threatened by a perception of arbitra-
riness.  But if the best of our efforts to understand the constrained 
judicial role in society are close to correct, then the true threats lie 
elsewhere. 
CONCLUSION 
Low-stakes decisions might not be worth much of our time, but 
determining which decisions are in fact low-stakes can be worth sig-
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nificant effort.  My sense is that this is the case for constitutional judi-
cial review.  It probably is worth investigating and reinvestigating the 
influence of judiciaries (if any) on the rest of social life when they 
wield supreme law, along with the influence of announced interpre-
tive method (if any) on those judicial decisions.  If these influences 
are normally modest, as much good work on the subject indicates, 
then we can look to other resources for guidance on how debates 
surrounding constitutional judicial review might and should proceed.  
Given that the analysis in Part II was rather brief, I must acknowledge 
the real possibility of error regarding the implications of low stakes 
for debates over interpretive method.  But this is an extended Essay, 
not an article.  And when it comes to the question of how best to de-
bate interpretive method, perhaps we do not have much to lose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
